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ABSTRACT:
Within the brokerage industry, hidden potential conflicts of interest between brokerage
firms and investors exist concerning brokerage remuneration. Usually unknown to the
investor, the brokerage agent has incentives, other than the standard commission, to sell a
certain fund family. The purpose of this project will be to examine the different types of
hidden conflicts of interest most prominent in the brokerage industry. The paper will
examine basic conflicts of interest inherent to the industry and more fully discuss the
problems related to conflicts that are hidden to investors. Recent rules and requirements
passed by regulators of the industry will by evaluated and the their effectiveness
discussed. The paper will recommend actions and policies that would help to resolve the
controversy.
Recent news articles, statements, and company announcements were reviewed and
analyzed. It was found that current regulations were not strict enough to properly protect
investors' interests. Current rules must be clearer concerning shelf-space payments and
brokerage firms must make more disclosure to investors concerning possible conflicts of
interest.
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"Conflicts of Interest Concerning Brokerage Remuneration and the Current Lack of
Proper Disclosure to Investorstt
There are inherent conflicts of interest in any professional service: it may not be
in a 1awyerts best interest to resolve a case quickly ifhe/she is paid an hourly rate; a
doctor is paid more for an operation that may not be entirely necessary; etc (Stonemant
1996). The same potential conflicts of interest exist within the brokerage industry. The
truth is that brokerage firms are in the business to sellt not to manage clients' money.
Brokerage firms receive a commission when a client buys or sells a security, regardless
of whether or not the security performs well. Very often, in the brokerage industry, there
are conflicts of interest that are not even known to the client.
The purpose of this paper will be to more closely examine the different hidden
conflicts of interest that are present within the brokerage industry and review the steps
that are and should be taken to expose the conflicts to the investing public.
A review of what a conflict of interest entails will be discussed before moving
more specifically to the inherent conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry. An
analysis of how conflicts of interest exist within the brokerage industry t unbeknownst to
investorst will be then be covered. Specific examples of hidden conflicts will be
reviewed here as well. Detailed examples of brokerage firms and fund companies at the
root of the problem will be examined. Current steps and proposals made by the
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and other agencies on this
matter will be analyzed and evaluated. New propositions to resolve this controversy will
also be suggested.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Any time something is done for different reasons, there is a potential conflict of
interest. Law professor, John Coffee Jr., of Columbia University, says that "Essentially,
the law says that there are times when you... should not accept other kinds of interests or
payments that could give you a reason to act contrary to the best interests of your
employer or the person to whom you owe a duty" (Mendels, 2001). Potential conflicts of
interest do not always become real but should be acknowledged. Tracy Pride Stoneman,
an attorney at law, advises that, "The number one guideline in choosing any professional
help is fIrst to determine what the potential conflicts of interest are and second, to try to
eliminate or control those conflicts" (Stoneman, 1996).
In the brokerage industry, there are several, well-known conflicts of interest
present. The fact that a broker receives a commission charged to hislher client is a given,
but a client cannot know for sure whether the stock that the broker recommended was in
hislher own best interests or the broker's. Like a hospital or a legal fIrm, a brokerage
fIrm is in the business to sell. A doctor makes the hospital more money when surgery is
performed than when it is avoided and a lawyer makes hislher fIrm more profIts when
more hours are spent on a case that could have been resolved quicker. A broker will
generate more profIts for him/herself and the fIrm when a client buys the product that is
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best for the fIrm. This is not to say that what is best for the client is mutually exclusive
from what is best for the fIrm, but, often enough, the interests of the fIrm take weight
over those of the client. A broker is paid hislher commission whether the stock he/she
recommended performs well or not.
As long as an investor is aware of these potential conflicts of interest, he/she can
take steps to eliminate, or at least reduce them. One must ask questions of the broker,
like, "How do you make money?" or, "Who pays you?" Stoneman recommends that an
investor remain a client to a broker as opposed to a customer, "If you remain a customer,
merely a person whom the broker calls when he has his next hot idea, the conflict
remains high" (Stoneman, 1996). To be a more aware client, one must build a
relationship with hislher broker. To reduce conflicts of interest, a client should make the
broker aware of his/her interests, goals, and financial needs through in depth
conversations. This process will help to diminish some of the more apparent conflicts of
interest. But, all too frequently, many of the conflicts of interest within the brokerage
industry are hidden from the client.

IDDDEN CONFLICTS

Aside from the commission that a broker receives when his/her client buys or
sells an investment, the broker can be remunerated in other ways. Most of the time, the
client is not even aware of the many other ways in which brokers are paid. Unless the
client reads the prospectus in detail, he/she may never know of the other forms of
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commission, which can be exorbitant. These hidden incentives pose a material conflict
of interest to the client.
Some stockbrokers, in addition to selling their firm's securities, sell from their
own portfolios. This practice gives a stockbroker an incentive to make a profit, on top of
their commission incentive (Stoneman, 1996). Although this practice is not illegal, a
client might think otherwise about making the investment if aware of the stockbroker's
motive for pushing the security. Closely linked to the broker's profit incentive in selling
from hislher own portfolio is the accelerated payout that some brokers receive from their
firm during their first year or month. Sometimes, as a bonus for coming to that firm, a
new broker will receive a higher commission rate for a specific period of time. After a
certain time the commission percentage drops (Stoneman, 1996). The client may never
know that he/she is paying a higher commission than normal but it is in the broker's best
interest to sell higher volume and ''push product" before his/her commission percentage
goes down (Stoneman, 1996). Even if the client is aware of the broker's high
commission rate, the client may not be aware that the rate is only temporary. The conflict
of interest is obvious and, if the client was aware of it, it seems likely that the client
would be more hesitant to place larger orders with a broker who might only be rushing to
get as much business as possible at a higher commission rate before it drops.
Common in many sales businesses is the sales contest. The person that sells the
most or a certain amount wins a prize or gets a bonus. This is a firm's way of increasing
its sales force's incentive to sell. These sales contests are perfectly legal but the naive
investor would probably make different investment choices knowing that his/her broker
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might only be recommending a certain stock so that he/she might win a vacation
(Stoneman, 1996).
One of the most popular hidden conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry is
what is known as "paying for shelf space". Paying for shelf space occurs when a fund
company pays a brokerage fnm a fee to preferably present its product on a recommended
or favored list to its clients (Pender, 2004). There are two ways, traditionally, that fund
companies can pay for shelf space. For one, the fund company could make a one time,
up-front cash payment to the brokerage fnm, this is known as revenue sharing. The other
way is for the fund company to send the fund's trading business to the brokerage fnm,
known as directed brokerage (pender, 2004).
Revenue-sharing agreements involve money that mutual fund companies pay to
brokerage fnms, in excess of the usual sales commissions, for promoting their funds. For
the extra, up-front payments, brokerage firms place the fund companies' funds, or
products, on a list of preferred or recommended stocks that brokers use in selling to
clients. This is a conflict of interest because it may not be in the best interests of the
investor to buy these funds that the brokerage firms are pushing. Most clients will never
even be aware of the potential conflict if they do not do detailed research into the
statements of additional information concerning their investment. Brokerage fnms and
fund companies will contest that "because fund companies make revenue-sharing
payments out of their own coffers, as opposed to fund assets, they, not fund shareholders,
are technically the ones paying for preferential treatment" (Jacobson, 2005).
Directed brokerage agreements are basically a potential conflict of interest
between a fund's advisor and its shareholders. In this practice, fund companies "direct"
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brokerage transactions to reward brokerage ftrms that also sell the companies' funds.
Recently made illegal by the SEC, "the potential conflict involving this practice has led
to concern about the use of shareholder assets by fund managers" (Questions & Answers
About ICI Actions, 2003). Unlike revenue-sharing agreements, which are paid for the
fund companies' own assets ftnance directed brokerage fmanced with shareholders'
assets. Mutual funds use brokerage ftrms for two reasons: brokerage ftrms sell mutual
funds and also execute the trades of securities in the fund's portfolio. Fund companies
are obligated to seek out the best value for their trades yet, in some instances, "direct"
trades to brokerage ftrms in consideration of the ftrm's sale of fund shares to investors
(Questions & Answers About ICI Actions, 2003). This practice was generally contained
by loose and often unclear regulations. The SEC has only recently recognized the
potential conflicts associated with this arrangement and has made the practice of directed
brokerage illegal. The SEC said, ''the practice posed a potential conflict because the
practice could put the interests of the mutual fund manager ahead of the fund's
shareholders" (Leitch, 2004). In the past months, many ftrms had been fined for failing
to conform to prior existing standards for directed brokerage agreements but no
admission of guilt on behalf of the fund companies was ever volunteered. Rarely were
any steps taken by the companies to really address the problem either. For the practice of
directed brokerage agreements to cease posing potential conflicts of interest, the laws
concerning the practice must continue to be enforced and steps must be taken for proper
disclosure.
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CURRENT EXAMPLES

The most widespread of the hidden conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry
is the practice of paying for shelf space. The fIrst aforementioned method of paying for
shelf-space, revenue sharing, poses a greater conflict than fund companies and brokerage
fums would have investors believe. In a statement posted by Merrill Lynch on its Web
site, they say that they "do not purchase placements on any preferred lists or any special
positioning or coverage of certain funds" (Jacobson, 2005). Yet, Merrill Lynch says,
"Funds that do not enter into arrangements with Merrill Lynch are generally not offered
to clients" (Jacobson, 2005). Basically, Merrill Lynch is saying that they do not offer
special treatment to certain funds because all of the funds they push on clients receive the
same special treatment. The companies that pay extra for Merrill Lynch to push their
product will be sold and others' funds that do not pay need not bother. Merrill Lynch and
other companies practicing revenue sharing in this manner would not lose related legal
cases due to the legalese. The potential conflicts of interest concerning revenue sharing
agreements are made all the more problematic because of the fact that those are generally
hidden conflicts.
After settling allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission), the government body responsible for regulating the stock market, the fIrm
did not stop accepting revenue sharing payments. In fact, they simply provided some
details on its Web site about how much money it receives from the firms it does business
with (See Appendix A) (Jacobson, 2005). For example, the Goldman Sachs fund family
paid Edward Jones $13.98 per $10,000 of fund assets invested with the firm in 2004. The
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Hartford fund family paid over $20 per $10,000 of assets invested with the fIrm
compared to the American funds that paid only $3.36 per $10,000 of assets with the fmn
(Preferred Mutual Fund Families, 2005). This disclosure may seem like a step in the
right direction towards better disclosure to investors but it only reinforces the truth that
the brokerage fmns have a conflict of interest. Edward Jones receives more money from
the Hartford fund family than the American funds and has more incentive to push
Hartford over the American funds. Simply disclosing the conflict, in this case, does not
do enough to help the situation; a major problem still exists.
The Securities and Exchange Commission views the directed brokerage method
of paying for shelf space as more of a problem because the directed brokerage
commissions are paid with shareholders' assets (Pender, 2004). Recently, the SEC
announced settlements with the companies that distribute Pimco stock funds. The
Commission highlighted a potential conflict of interest and, without admitting
responsibility, the Pimco bodies consented to pay a total of $20.6 million in state and
federal fmes. The numerous fmes relate to charges that the entities failed to properly
disclose to their clients that they paid brokerage fmns to promote the sale of its funds
(Pender, 2004). Though the companies that manage Pimco stock funds were charged
with not properly disclosing hidden conflicts of interest to investors, they never admitted
fault and have not done much to stop the conflicts.
The Securities and Exchange Commission sued the company that distributes
Pimco stock, PA Distributors, and two additional fmns that manage Pimco stock funds
for not appropriately disclosing to investors the directed brokerage agreements with nine
other brokerage fIrms, which were not named (Edward Jones Pays, 2004). At the time,
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the directed brokerage agreements that these companies had were legal. The California
attorney general sued PA Distributors for not disclosing the directed brokerage
agreements or the revenue sharing agreements. PA Distributors provided some
information to investors about the agreements but Attorney General Bill Lockyer said,
''that was not sufficiently detailed or appropriate disclosure" (Pender, 2004). PA
Distributors settled to pay a $5 million fine that will go into the California State general
fund and $4 million to cover the state's legal fees. PA Distributors also agreed that it
would "provide much better disclosure about its shelf-space payments in its prospectus or
statement of additional information" (pender, 2004). Still, better disclosure to investors
does not go far enough.
Even though the law is unclear concerning the proper procedure for disclosing
these conflicts of interest, the law requires adequate disclosure to investors. Other
companies that provide disclosure to investors of potential conflicts of interest give just
enough disclosure for the law to view it as adequate. Buried within the prospectus is the
disclosure of the potential conflicts of interest and only when read in detail will an
investor be aware of the potential problems. Even when given a prospectus before, or in
some cases after, investors have purchased mutual funds, few investors bother to ever
read it in the detail required to decipher the legalese (Pender, 2004). The level of
disclosure that the law considers adequate can hardly provide investors with enough
information to understand that there even is a potential conflict of interest. Even with the
disclosure that these fl1111s
provide, the conflicts still remain hidden.
Like the Pimco entities that settled charges in September of last year, brokerage
firm Edward D. Jones & Co. recently settled allegations of improper mutual fund
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marketing without admitting or denying responsibility (Edward Jones Pays, 2004).
Edward Jones agreed to pay $75 million in fmes and take corrective measures to settle
with regulators. The Edward Jones settlement came after a string of similar settlements
with other fund companies. MFS Investment Management settled with the Commission
earlier that year in March for $50 million for keeping its trustees and investors in the dark
concerning the details of agreements with distributors to sell MFS funds (Edward Jones
Pays, 2004). In November, a month prior to the Edward Jones settlement, Morgan
Stanley agreed to pay $50 million in settlement of charges that it did not inform investors
of the compensation it received for selling specific fund shares (Edward Jones Pays,
2004). Nowhere among these settlements do the companies take responsibility for the
allegations against them.
One of the terms of Edward Jones's settlement was that it had to disclose on its
public Web site the information regarding its revenue sharing payments (See Appendix
A) and hire an independent consultant to review its new disclosures (Edward Jones Pays,
2004). This action is at least a little clearer than PA Distributors' promise to provide
"better disclosure" of shelf-space agreements. Some believe that this, still, does not go
far enough to address the problem. The "corrective measures" that Edward Jones plans
to take to conform with SEC requirements and the $75 million settlement is "inadequate",
says Califomia's Attorney General Bill Lockyer (Edward Jones Pays, 2004). Companies
are paying for their failure to communicate the potential conflicts of interest to investors
but are not doing enough to correct the problems. Even with disclosures like Edward
Jones's Web statement regarding its "Preferred Mutual Fund Family Revenue Sharing
Agreement", investors will still be ignorant of the potential conflicts of interest if they do
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not perform their own detailed research into their investment fIrm (Edward Jones Pays,
2004).
Currently, regulators are cracking down on these hidden conflicts of interest.
Mostly, however, as we have seen, regulators are simply making allegations and charging
fmes. Some corrective measures have been taken to help the current situation, but only in
a very minimal way. The steps that have been taken to actually remedy the situation and
feasible actions towards resolution will be discussed next.

STEPS TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR
RESOLUTION

Regulators of the securities industry have not been totally idle while these hidden
potential conflicts of interest remain widespread in the business. Early last year the
Securities and Exchange Commission proposed new rules to require disclosure to
investors of the ways in which brokerage fIrms make money selling mutual funds
(Labaton,2004).

Basically, what Edward Jones was forced to do a few months earlier,

publicly revealing how much it is paid when it sells certain funds, is now required for all
brokerage fIrms. Now, certain arrangements between fund companies and brokerage
houses can be legal as long as it is fully disclosed to investors. The SEC says that, "the
problem in too many cases is that investors in the mutual funds have been kept in the
dark about such payments and the fact that their brokers have a fmancial interest in
promoting a particular fund" (Labaton, 2004). The new requirements do not go far
enough to state what full disclosure actually entails. Companies like to bury the
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disclosure in the prospectus, or statement of additional information, and call that "full
disclosure". Most investors lack the ability to fully interpret the legal jargon that
prospectuses are printed in and few will ever take the time to pour over the details of a
these statements.
Concerning shelf-space payments, the Securities and Exchange Commission
recently announced, on August 18, 2004, "Under the amendments adopted today to rule
12b-1 of the Investment Company Act, investment companies will be prohibited from
paying for the distribution of their shares with brokerage commissions" (SIA: Directed
Brokerage Ban, 2004). This new rule will stop the mutual funds from using the directed
brokerage method of buying shelf space to compensate brokerage fIrms. This rule will
not bar the fund companies from transactions to broker-dealers that "distribute fund
shares where funds have policies and procedures designed to insure that the transactions
are consistent with best execution obligations, and not tied to the level of fund sales"
(SIA: Directed Brokerage Ban, 2004). While this is a step in the right direction to
properly address the conflict of interest issues, problems still arise.
The amendments to rule 12b-1 prohibit fund companies from directing business to
brokerage fIrms unless policies are in place to insure best execution trades for investors.
This does not eliminate the threat of a potential conflict of interest. The policies in place
that are supposed to insure best executions are tied to the level of fund sales, not the
funds themselves. In the Edward Jones example (refer to Appendix A), this rule would
not guard against the brokerage fIrm pushing Hartford funds (annual asset fees based on
$20.90 per $10,000) over American Funds (annual asset fees based on $3.36 per $10,000)
(Preferred Mutual Fund Families, 2005). To dodge this new rule, all a brokerage fIrm
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needs to do is push a more expensive fund to avoid best execution policies tied to fund
levels.
The Commission's efforts cannot seem to strangle the brokerage industry with too
tight a grip, but it cannot have too loose a hold either. A line down the middle of the road
should be drawn where there is enough regulation to protect investors without being too
laissez-faire. The amendments to rule 12b-l are not powerful enough to fully outlaw
directed brokerage. A company like Merrill Lynch can still get away with directed
brokerage if they have "policies and procedures" designed to promote best execution.
However Merrill Lynch executes their trades, they win. Merrill Lynch only offers funds
to its investors when fund companies pay them fees to promote them. Rule 12b-l only
requires policies of best execution tied to the level of fund sales, not the funds
themselves. Merrill Lynch and Edward Jones will not be fazed by the new amendments
~---

to the rule because they are not strict enough to adequately protect investors.
To better address the problems in the brokerage industry regarding hidden
conflicts of interest, regulators should be more specific as to what "full disclosure"
actually means. Any rule passed has yet to say that a broker-dealer is required to inform
hislher client of the potential conflict of interest. Currently, a broker-dealer need only
hide the details of a possible conflict in paperwork. Without being too strict, but still
managing to better protect investors, the Commission should be more rigorous and
definite about its disclosure requirements. The SEC could require that all investors,
before the time of sale, acknowledge that they have been informed by their brokerage
firm of a potential conflict of interest. A rule like this will not diminish the potential
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conflicts but will at least put the conflict on the forefront and the problems will cease to
be hidden from investors.
To address the shelf-space payments, stricter rules are also needed to help resolve
the potential conflicts of interest. Directed brokerage, regardless of the policies and
procedures in place to help promote best execution practices, should be illegal. As shown
before, even with best execution policies, ftrms like Edward Jones and Merrill Lynch can
still have a conflict of interest with their clients. The current rules regarding directed
brokerage and best execution requirements are tied to the level of fund sales. New rules
tied to the fees paid by fund companies to brokerage ftrms should be put in place. Fund
companies should not be allowed to use shareholders' assets to make payments to
brokerage houses, like Edward Jones and Merrill Lynch, which only offer funds that have
paid for shelf space. The rule should be, flat-out, that it would be illegal to use
shareholders' assets to make payments to brokerage house for directing a company's
business; all forms of directed brokerage need to be illegal in order to better protect the
investor.
As for the other form of paying for shelf space: revenue sharing agreements, fund
companies and brokerage house will insist that because fund companies make the
payments from their own pockets, no one is hurt. This is not true. A potential conflict of
interest still exists between the brokerage ftrm and the investor. Just because the fund
company makes payments from its own assets and not the investors', it does not mean
that the brokerage ftrm is any less pressured to push those preferred funds. In cases of
revenue sharing, regulators should require more blatant forms of disclosure to clients
about the potential conflicts.
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To better protect and infonn the investor, the Securities and Exchange
Commission could make a rule requiring that brokerage fInns state outright to investors
in every instance of transaction, whether they are influenced by a revenue-sharing
agreement with the fund company. A written agreement should be read and agreed to by
the investor before the sale. This rule would not lessen the potential conflict of interest,
but by making it better known to the investor, the investor could make a more infonned
decision about the fund that he/she was buying.

CONCLUSIONS

"A customer has the right to know what the incentives are when the selling broker
recommends a particular fund family" (Labaton, 2004). The issues surrounding potential
conflicts of interest have been discussed. The current examples of hidden conflicts of
interest have been highlighted. Shelf-space agreements, both revenue-sharing
agreements and directed brokerage agreements, have been evaluated for potential
conflicts of interest between brokerage fInns and investors. While revenue-sharing
agreements do not require payments from shareholders' assets, they still pose a threat to
investors. Even though directed brokerage agreements have been deemed illegal by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, fund companies and brokerage fInns can still fInd
ways to sidestep the rules. Stricter rules must be put in place by regulators. Without
tightening its grasp so much to choke the industry, the SEC must put in place better rules
to protect investors. Shelf space agreements, in the fonn of revenue sharing, should still
be legal when the proper disclosure is made. For proper disclosure, a brokerage fInn
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must be required to communicate to the client frankly that a potential for a conflict of
interest exists and seek acknowledgement from the client before making any sale. This
way, regulators will not too tightly control the industry and the investing public will be
better informed and protected.
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Federated
Investors
Goldman Sar:hs GroUD
Hartford Mutual Funds
Lord Abbett Funds

Putnam Investments
Van Kamoen InW!!stments

What does it mean to be a preferred

family?

Edward Jones exclusively promotes preferred fund families on this Web site and in other mutual fund and 529 plan marketing materials. The
preferred fund families have greater access to our Investment representatives to provide training, marketing support and educational
presentations. Consequently, while our Investment representatIves may sell, and our customers are free to select funds from many mutual
fund families, as discussed below, there are financial Incentives associated with the sale of preferred funds. Virtually all of Edward Jones'
transactions relating to mutual funds Involve preferred family funds.
If you own a preferred fund, or If you are Interested In our preferred fund families, we want you to be aware of our revenue sharing
arrangements. Edward Jones receives payments known as revenue sharing from the preferred fund families. While the receipt of revenue
sharing Is among the factors that determine whether a fund Is treated as "preferred," such payments are not the only factor considered in
deciding which fund families are designated as preferred. Edward Jones' investment representatives and equity owners benefit financially
from the receipt of revenue sharing payments from the advisers and distributors of the preferred fund families. The firm does not receive
revenue-sharing payments from any non-preferred mutual fund families.
These revenue sharing payments are In addition to standard sales loads, annual service fees (referred to as Rule 12b-l fees), expense
reimbursements, sub-transfer agent fees for maintaining customer account Information and providing other administrative services for the
mutual funds (shareholder accounting and networking fees), and any reimbursement for education, marketing support and training-related
expenses. For more Information about fees, please see About Mutual Funds.
Revenue sharing, as received by Edward Jones, Involves a payment from a mutual fund company's Investment adviser or the company that
distributes a mutual fund company's shares. Revenue sharing Is calculated in different ways by the different preferred funds. For Instance,
some fund distributors or advisers pay Edward Jones a fee based on the value of assets under management. This Is called an asset-based
fee. This generally means that each year you maintain your holdings In a preferred mutual fund, Edward Jones Is paid by the fund company
adviser or distributor. For exam pie, If you made a $10,000 preferred mutual fund purchase and held It for a year, and Its value remained the
same, Edward Jones would be paid by the adviser or distributor .075% or 7.5 basis points. That would translate to a $7.50 payment from the
preferred fund's distributor or adviser to Edward Jones for the $10,000 investment In your account. For every subsequent year you held that
$10,000 preferred mutual fund investment In your Edward Jones account, the fund's distributor or adviser would make a $7.50 payment to
Edward Jones, assuming no change In the value of your $10,000 investment. Asset-based payments will Increase or decrease from year to
year with changes In the value of fund assets held by Edward Jones' clients. Again, this payment is not an additional charge to you by the
mutual fund company or Edward Jones, but comes from the fund company Investment adviser or distributor.
Other distributors or advisers may pay Edward Jones a fee for each share of the fund that Edward Jones sells. This is referred to as a sales.
based fee and Is based on the dollar value of your purchase. For example, a preferred mutual fund distributor or adviser may pay Edward
Jones .125% or 12.5 basis points for each dollar of shares purchased by you. Therefore, if you purchase $10,000 of that preferred mutual
fund, Its adviser or distributor would pay Edward Jones $12.50 for that transaction. This payment Is not an additional charge to you by the
mutual fund company or Edward Jones, but comes from the fund company Investment adviser or distributor.
There are, as noted above, other formulas and types of revenue sharing. The chart below summarizes Edward Jones' revenue sharing
arrangements by Identifying the preferred fund family, the name of the entity that actually pays the revenue sharing to Edward Jones, the
amount of revenue sharing that Edward Jones receives from each of the preferred families based on $10,000 of assets purchased ("Sales
Fees") or held by a client ("Annual Asset Fees"), and the total amount of revenue sharing in dollars that Edward Jones earned from each
preferred fund family adviser or distributor from January through November 2004.
Preferred
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Federated5
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owned)
Sales
Fees' (Per
$10,000 of
fund assets
purchased)

$0

$0

$0

$12.11

$0

$12.50

$21.97

Total
Earned

$29.2
million

$1.4 million

$4.1 million

$18.1
million

$11.5
million

$10.6
million

$14.3million

Goldman
Sachs Asset
Management,
L.P. and/or

Hartford
Investment
Financial
Services,

Lord
Abbett
Distributor
LLC

Van
Putnam
Kampen
Retail
Management Funds, Inc.
Limited

January

-

December
2004'
Paid by

Federated
American
Investment
Funds
Distributors, Management
Co.;
Inc.

